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ABSTRACT 
 
We discuss the problems of consensus and unity in science. The natural sciences seem to 
contrast with many other areas of endeavor in that a high level of consensus seems to 
exist in them. However, a careful analysis of the structure of particular physical theories, 
such as those concerned with electrons, shows that there is great heterogeneity of both 
theory and methodology. We argue that the natural science community tends to be 
tolerant of diversity. We contrast this tolerance among natural scientists with the more 
overt disagreement occurring in the social sciences and humanities. Our central theme is 
that many intellectual problems arise from straining too hard to make a successful 
perspective into a total worldview. 
 
 
 
Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein: for nature is 
always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action; 
that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from 
one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and 
the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through 
nature’s universal laws and rules – SPINOZA 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The revised modern scientific version of Genesis resembles in many ways the older 
version. The following figure compactly summarizes modern cosmology. All that exists 
is assumed to fit together into a compact hierarchy, all of which is ultimately reducible to 
the lower levels, which are both ontologically more fundamental and older in time than 
the upper levels. The background represents space-time. Time itself only goes back a 
finite amount usually estimated as around 13.7 billion years. 
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Although this presents a nice picture, all does not fit together quite so neatly. Einstein, the 
founder of modern cosmology, hoped to be able to explain everything by a purely geometric 
theory of curved space-time. Complex patterns of bumps and ripples in space-time were to be 
the underlying reality for what we usually call light, matter, animals and people. His program 
had reasonable success with bulk light and matter. For instance he was able to obtain the 
Newtonian Gravitational Theory as a first approximation, and higher order approximations 
resolved the anomaly in the perehellion shift of the orbit of Mercury (a major open 
problem in celestial mechanics for over fifty years). But his approach was never able to 
incorporate the modern theory of photons and electrons. His attempt to entirely bypass 
modern quantum theory was never fully successful. The current approach is simply to 
add quantum phenomena to space-time. More precisely, one assumes that in each region 
of space-time one can perform certain experiments such as applying photon detectors, 
electron detectors, etc. Each region has a disposition for responding to the experiments in 
various ways. Thus, in our figure the early region marked “Light” is to be understood as a 
region having a disposition to respond affirmatively to photon detectors but negatively to 
electron detectors. In other words, the elementary particles of modern quantum  
mechanics are not things, in the ordinary sense, but more akin to glimpses of things 
which cannot be said to exist when no one is looking. This distinction is made necessary 
by the attribution of stochastic properties to the independent existents. Thus, what does 
exist when we are not looking is a probabilistic disposition. Therefore, it is not correct to 
say that the early universe consisted of photons, although we might say that it consisted 
of a particular type of dispositional structure. According to the proponents of this 
quantum field theory, it is supposed to encompass all phenomena. It is having reasonable 
success in predicting such phenomena as the matter-anti-matter distribution and the 
hydrogen-helium distribution in the universe at various times. But what of biological 
phenomena? Obviously, quantum field theory is not presently adequate for predicting 
biological phenomena. The problem goes far deeper than mere lack of prediction, 
however. From what we have said so far it should be clear that it would be a mistake to 
say that a tree, for example, is “made up” of fundamental particles. It would follow that 
trees do not exist unless they are looked at, and this is simply not what we mean by tree ( 
the rather silly claims of the radical skeptic, notwithstanding ). On the other hand, it does 
not seem much better to say that a tree is really a probabilistic dispositional structure.  
Thus there seems to be an irreconcilable incompatibility between the language of biology 
and that of quantum mechanics similar to the situation holding between quantum 
mechanics and general relativity. It is not just that the reduction of biology to physics has 
not been worked out. Rather it would appear that such a reduction is impossible in 
principle. As another example, a geologist wants to say that India collided with Asia, 
throwing up the Himalayas. He does not want to use probabilistic language. For him this 
event is a fact which he can almost see. The physicists language becomes even more 
inappropriate when applied to history or to Wigner's friend. If the reader is still 
unconvinced about the problems of reconciling the use of dispositional language with the 
points of view of biology, geology, and history, and feels that he can satisfactorily  
follow  J.S. Mill in considering objects as permanent possibilities of experience, then we 
invite him to contemplate the following recent developments at the forefront of 
physics. We have described the big bang model as a quantum field theory in a curved 
space-time. But J. Wheeler has long advocated a much more ambitious program of 
quantizing geometry itself (Wheeler, 1964, 1968). This program is now moving from the 
stage of being a philosophical vision to a well developed mathematical theory (see the 
surveys of DeWitt, 1979, and Hawking, 1979). Soon there may be strong experimental 
confirmation, for instance, in the scattering of light past black holes and in the properties 
of the background radiation due to conditions in the very early universe (10^ - 43 second  
after the beginning ). In these theories the past did not actually occur. Instead one has a 
superposition over the ensemble of all pasts. No particular past really occurred, but they 
were all virtually present. And this virtual presence shows up in interference terms  
occurring in the scattering matrix. The philosophical implications of this 
theory were explored in the fifties by Everett (see DeWi t t and Graham, 1973). We don't 
believe that there is any possibility of reconciliation between this viewpoint and ordinary 
common sense, not to mention the rest of science. Even Carl Sagan would 
be too embarrassed to seriously present this worldview to the public. The traditional 
conception of the unity of science is belied by these examples. The various sciences do 
not fit together into a single coherent picture. In fact, we will argue below that 
incompatibilities are commonplace even within a single science and often even within a 
single scientific paper. Moreover, these incompatibilities are often not to be viewed as 
defects needing remedy, but, instead, as rational responses to a very complex situation. 
Indeed we argue below that the Euclidean ideal of unity must give way to that of a more 
sophisticated conception. 
 
In #2 we survey some of the inevitable problems generated by the attempt to build a 
thoroughgoing Euclidean world view. In #3 we discuss three episodes in science which 
epitomize the eternal dialectic between Euclidean and non-Euclidean approaches 
to the Universe. In #4 we present a viewpoint we call perspective realism. In #5 we show 
that non-Euclidean viewpoints even pervade the exact sciences. In #6 we point out that 
modern biology refuses to take the ontology of modern physics (i.e., quantum mechanics) 
seriously and the changes of language that would be required of biology to so adapt to 
quantum theory. We also give a long quote of Pauling's which clearly shows chemistry's 
independence of physics. In #7 we consider the relationship between the humanities and 
sciences and in #8 we reconsider the possibilities open to theology. In #9 we draw our 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Grand Visions and Their Implications 
 
There have been several bold attempts in the last few millenia to give a simple answer to 
the question, "What is the stuff of the universe?" The early Greek philosophers offer us 
several grand visions . Thales tells us that all is water, Anaximenes that all is air, 
Heraclitus that all is fire. The view of Parmenides that all is being is particularly  
intriguing, as is the claim of Pythagoras that all is number. And, of course, there is the 
atomism of Lucretius and Democritus which has much in common with more modern 
conceptions. By comparison, Aristotle's ontology is much more complex. 
For Aristotle, the universe is made up of a heterogeneous nested hierarchy of locations, 
each of which contains substances to which are associated various qualities. Some of the 
qualities are realized, some are unrealized. The two great cosmologies which dominate 
our own era are those of Newton and Einstein. Newton's basic elements are particles 
which have very few properties (e.g., size, mass, attractive force) and exist in a 
homogeneous, three-dimensional s pa c e and one-dimensional time framework. And, as 
we have seen, Einstein's universe is as spare as any of the early Greeks'. These grand 
reductionist programs are things of great beauty, and some (e.g., Newton 's and Einstein's 
) have displayed  remarkable predictive power. What they all have in common, however, 
is that they leave no place for other viewpoints such as our ordinary common-sense view 
of the world. Since the world is said to be "really nothing but --, " our tables and chairs, 
theaters and ethical theories are robbed of ontological status. And this is the case even 
though the actual reduction of these entities to the elements of the cosmological theory in 
question is almost never accomplished. Thus, we (qua ordinary human beings) have been 
continually reminded throughout the centuries that the realm we inhabit is a mere  
fiction. We are condemned to Plato's cave having to make do with shadows on the 
wall. There is something profoundly dissatisfying about this. In fact, as we 
will show below, it is more than just dissatisfying. 
 
Locke's epistemology is the classic articulation of the conflict between the viewpoint of 
the ordinary person and that of the physicist. For Locke, knowledge comes from two 
sources--the physical world and our own mind. The former is represented 
by the “primary" qualities, the latter by the "secondary." It is no coincidence that Locke 
was a contemporary of Newton. The primary qualities include solidity, extension, figure 
 (i.e., shape), motion or rest, and number. These qualities are in external objects. They 
are real. The secondary qualities which include all other properties of objects (e.g., color, 
heat, taste, etc.) are in the beholder rather than the external world. 
Locke tells us that "whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them [i.e., the secondary 
qualities], are in truth nothing in the objects themselves." (Locke, 1690, Book II, VII  
I.14). Although Locke's primary qualities are not identical to those which form the 
elmental properties within Newton's system, the influence is clear. For example, in 
describing how the secondary qualities are derived from the primary ones, 
Locke explicitly invokes a Newtonian explanation: After the same manner that the ideas 
of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of 
secondary qualities are also produced, vis. by the operation of insensible particles on our 
senses. For, it being manifest that there are bodies and good store of bodies, each whereof 
are so small, that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or 
motion  let us suppose at present that the different motions and figures, bulk 
and number, of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us 
those different sensations which we have from the colors and smells of bodies (book II , 
VII I .13 ). Thus, Locke gave favored onto logical status to a certain viewpoint (i.e., that 
of  Newtonian physics), and inevitably had to relegate all other viewpoints to a 
questionable status. His titles to sections VII I.l7 and VIII I S of Book II tell the 
whole story: "The ideas of the primary alone really exist." "The secondary exist in things 
only as modes of the primary." And as the night follows the day, a dualism like Locke's 
leads either to a radical idealism or to a radical skepticism. Hence, Berkeley and Hume 
followed upon the heels of Locke. 
What Berkeley showed, basically, was that all of the arguments which Locke used to  
show that some qualities are secondary apply as well to the primary qualities. He tells us 
let anyone consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours 
and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to 
prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion (1710, 10). If some observed 
properties are in the world and others merely in our head, how can we distinguish the 
two? Or more to the point, how can we claim that anything exists at al1 except what 
is in our head? In other words, Locke's admission that we live partially in a world of 
appearance makes it difficult to maintain the qualifier partially. As Berkeley (1710) puts 
it: 
 
Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or 
external things, of which our ideas are pictures or 
representations be themselves perceivable or not? 
If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained 
our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to 
anyone whether it be sense to assert a colour is 
like something which is invisible (8 ) . 
 
Later in the treatise Berkeley explicitly invokes physics. 
He uses it as a stick to beat the realist into submission: 
 
Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according 
to them infinite and shapeless, and it is the mind that 
frames all that variety of bodies which compose the 
visible world, any one where of does not exist longer than 
it is perceived (47). 
 
Of course, Berkeley, by invoking God, ultimately opted for a position quite similar to 
Locke's, the mind of God playing the role that the external world played for Locke. It 
remained for Hume to remove God from the picture and thus end up with radical 
skepticism. Hume tells us that “It must certainly be allowed that nature has kept us 
at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the objects of a few 
superficial qualities of objects, while she conceals from us those powers and principles on 
which the influence of those objects entirely depends (1739, 29).” 
For Hume, all facts reduce to cause and effect, and cause and effect reduces to the  
conclusion from experience that the future will be like the past. But this conclusion is 
nothing but an unfounded leap. Therefore all knowledge is founded upon a very 
shaky foundation. We many not even be justified in claiming that knowledge is possible. 
 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume mapped out the territory in which the philosophical debates 
of the next two hundred years took place. The British empiricists generally tried to  
salvage a dualism similar to Locke’s, whereas the German idealists tended to 
follow Berkeley and Hume in looking askance at the primary qualities. Hence, we have , 
on the one hand, James and John Stuart Mill, whose elaborate associationisms where  
essentially schemes to get from primary to secondary qualities, and on the other 
hand Kant and Fichte. Kant pushed the primary qualities into 
the realm of the unknowable. Fichte did away with them altogether. 
In summary, the attempt to account for all that exists within one grand scheme inevitably 
gives birth to a skepticism which calls into question even the grand scheme itself. This  
is particularly problematical when a reductionist program is widely accepted, and even 
more so when it is widely accepted but left unexamined. In our opinion, that is exactly 
the situation we have today. The great success of physics has led to its near universal 
acceptance as the description of what is real. This is not to say that the average person 
knows much about physics, or that his conception of the physical really bears much  
resemblance to the physicist's. On the contrary, the typical conception of the 
“real” physical world contains a hodgepodge of concepts f rom Aristotle, Newton,  
Einstein and commonsense. This conception does not, however, get one very far in most 
realms of human inquiry. Therefore, despite the work of modern philosopher’s such as 
Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin, variations on the epistemologies of Locke, Hume, and 
Berkeley are ubiquitous. They pervade modern psychology and linguistics, art and  
literary criticism, and have even made in roads in biology and the philosophy of science. 
The arguments are surprisingly similar in the various fields. They typically begin with  
the demonstration that the physicist's description is inadequate. This leads to the 
proposition that the phenomenon in question forms an autonomous system which may 
or may not be related to reality. Thus, brains are about brains, minds about minds, art is 
about art, language is about language, etc. Sometimes there is an added twist in that the  
attempt is made to reduce everything to the phenomenon under study. 
Psychology is an interesting case in point. From its beginnings, psychology has followed 
Locke in making a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, with the latter 
assumed to be its major province. The picture that Helmholtz (1867) drew was of  the 
mind divided into sensations (described by the physicist) on the one hand and  
unconscious inferences on the other. The latter were designed to fill the gap between the 
physicist's world and the ordinary perceiver's. In other words, the perceiver begins with 
meaningless patterns of energy, and infers tables, chairs, etc., from them. 
The jargon has, of course, changed over the decades. Today psychologists speak of 
sensory input and stages of information processing, for example, but the basic models are 
indistinguishable from Helmholtz's, which is to say from Locke's. The 
common use of the term "constructivism" within psychology reveals 
the Lockean spirit. Since the "input" is impoverished the person must construct his or her 
world out of the available building blocks. For example, Gregory (1966) desc ribes the 
problem of visual perception thus: 
 
Given the slenderest clues to the nature of surrounding objects we identify them and act 
not so much according to what is directly sensed, but to what is believed (p.I I). 
 
And just as Locke led to Hume, radical skepticism is unavoidable in modern psychology. 
Suppose our inferences are incorrect. Since all we have are our own representations, how 
do we know there is a world at all? This is just the train of thought that Fodor (1980) has 
recently presented in the context of arguing for what he calls "methodological solipsism." 
Fodor tells us that "a naturalistic psychology, i.e., a psychology which explicates 
the organism's relationship to the world, is, for practical purposes, out of the question" (p 
. 70 ). A naturalistic psychology would require "that the stimulus be physically specified 
" (p.71). What does Fodor mean by physical? He makes it clear when he points out that  
"If they [i.e., naturalistic psychologists] really had to wait for the physicists to determine 
the description how would the psychology get off the ground?" (p.71). Thus Fodor joins 
his forbears in deferring to the physicist for the description of what it means to be 
physical, and as a consequence, finding himself left with solipsism. 
The biological version of this is represented in particularly blunt form by Maturana and 
Varela (1980). According to them, living systems are characterized by autonomy. The 
following depiction of their approach indicates that they do not mean autonomy in a 
trivial sense: 
 
 
I n other words, the new approach required us to treat seriously the activity of the nervous 
system as determined by the nervous system itself, and not by the 
external world, thus the external world would only have a triggering role in the release of 
the internally determined activity of the nervous system (p.XV). 
 
In a discussion of how they arrived at their position, they refer to the discovery that one 
had to close off the nervous system to account for its operation, and that perception 
should not be viewed as a grasping of an external reality, but rather as the specification of 
one (p. XV). How did they discover this? In doing brain research, they found that they 
could not account for the manifold chromatic experiences of the observer 
by mapping the visible colorful world upon the activity of the nervous system" (p . XIV). 
In other words, they began with a characterization of the physical input to the system,  
and when this characterization did not allow them to predict cell firings, 
rather than attempting a reconceptualization of the inputs, they 
concluded that the nervous system creates its own reality. We find the same type of 
thinking in linguistics as represented by the rejection of referential accounts of semantics.  
Frege's (1960) account of meaning has a very Lockean flavor. 
Meaning at the word level is a combination of reference which is related directly to the 
world and sense which is not. His classic example was that Venus is referred to both as 
the morning star and as the evening star. Both of these terms have the same referent so  
their meaning must differ in some other way, i.e., they must have different senses. Again 
we find a conflation of the scientist's viewpoint with the ordinary person's. 
The two terms in question must refer to the same thing because the astronomer tells us 
they are the same. At the sentence level, Frege went even further: "We are therefore  
driven into accepting the truth value of a sentence as constituting its reference" (p , 63). 
It is a short step from Frege's position to the view that language is a completely 
autonomous system. Since language does not refer to the world as defined by the  
physicist, it must not refer to any thing, except possibly concepts (which just pushes 
the problem back one step) or language itself. In other words language is thought to be an 
"autonomous" system just like the living organism is for Maturana and Varela and the 
mind is for Fodor. Indeed, Fodor (1980) invoked Bloomfield's claim that the pursuit 
of semantics is basically impossible. The argument goes that since, for example, salt  
really refers to NaCl , we would have to rely upon chemistry in order to give a coherent 
account of minerals. It follows that we cannot say much about what words refer 
to because the appropriate scientific reductions have not been performed. 
In modern linguistics, reference is often ignored altogether. Since language is treated as 
an autonomous system, the role of semantics becomes one of accounting for phenomena 
such as synonomy, ambiguity, and homonomy which can be treated as relations between 
sentences or between words, rather than as relations between language and the world. 
Treating language in this way has some interesting implications. For one thing it puts a 
strange cast upon linguistic analysis, which dominates British and American philosophy. 
If the task of philosophy is the analysis and reformulation of language, and if language 
does not refer to the world, the mainstream of modern philosophy begins to seem like a 
solipsistic endeavor. Does philosophy become the study of philosophical questions which 
are not about anything except themselves? That is not the impression that one gets from 
reading Wittgenstein or Ryle. On the other hand, Ayer’s claim that "the propositions of 
philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character " (Ayer,1936, p.35) opens the door 
to the usual questions. If language is not factual, how can we tell whether or not we are 
merely spinning our wheels by analyzing language as a method of doing 
philosophy? How can we tell the "factual" from the "linguistic"? 
How can we tell that the language we use in our own analysis of language is not 
"merely linguistic"? These issues also come up in literary criticism. If language 
is not about reality, it follows that literature must not be either. Thus we have the  
concept of "literary autonomy." J. Hillis Miller (1971 ), for example, puts it this way: 
 
If meaning in language rises not f rom the reference 
of signs to some thing outside words but, from differential 
relations among the words themselves, if "referent " 
and “meaning”must always be distinguished, then the 
notion of literary text which is validated by its one-to-one 
correspondence to some social, historical, or psychological 
reality can no longer be taken for granted(p.85). 
 
It appears that this ideology has, to some extent become a 
self-fulfilling prophesy. Much of modern literature is the 
result of a conscious attempt to avoid the description of any external 
reality. The extreme form is modern poetry which consists 
of the juxtaposition of words in a manner which defies being read 
in anything like the normal manner. The reader looks in vain 
for any meaning at all. Modern critics, however, are not content to restrict this 
"formalist" interpretation to works which are explicit in their 
formalism. What must count as the reductio-ad-absurdum in this 
vein are such statements as Miller's claim that Charles Dickens' 
Sketches by Boz only seems to be an example of straight-forward 
realism. In truth, says Miller, it was something of a Trojan 
Horse to illustrate the fallacies of realism. The work calls 
attention to its own fictionality. He tells us that "This movement  
lies, between a focus upon the literal referents and a 
focus upon their fictional quality challenges the authenticity 
of what is represented while what is represented in its turn 
undermines the apparent solidity of the Sketches as an innocent 
act of representational mirroring" (pp . 11 5-116 ). And later we 
find that the narrator "gives the reader the information he 
needs to free himself f rom a realistic interpretation of the 
Sketches"(p.119). 
 
Analogous to this New Criticism in literature is the approach 
to art criticism championed by Clement Greenberg. In modern art, 
according to Greenberg (1961,p.6), "Content is to be dissolved 
so completely into form that the work of art or literature cannot 
be reduced in whole or in part to anything not itself." 
Thus, "avant -garde culture is the imitation of imitating" (p.8). 
Also like Miller, Greenberg was not above reinterpreting 
realistic paintings into formalist terms. For example, he 
suggests that critics of the future may consider the illusion of depth  
and volume (in the Old Masters) to have been aesthetically valuable 
primarily because it enabled and encouraged the artist 
to organize such infinite subtleties of light and dark, 
of translucence and transparence, into effectively 
pictorial entities (pp.137-138). The radical skepticism which is born of a misapplication 
of the scientific endeavor comes full circle in modern philosophy 
of science. The philosopher of science's equivalent to 
Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is 
the distinction between fact and theory or between observational 
statements and theoretical statements. The former are real. 
The latter are inferred from the former. The logical positivists 
tried to ground science in a solid, proven set of observables  
which were not themselves dependent upon any particular 
theory. However, the realization that the positivists' 
conception of observation was not powerful enough to account for 
the f acts of science opened the door to a skepticism from which 
the philosophy of science has not yet recovered . As Lakatos 
(1970) describes the predicament: 
 
The demarcation between the soft, unproven "theories" 
and the hard, proven "empirical basis" is nonexistent: 
all propositions of science are theoretical and, incurably, 
fallible (p.100). 
 
Thus, the belief that science is uniquely capable of getting 
at the truth engenders a skepticism concerning non-scientific 
truth which is inevitably turned upon science itself. The extreme 
form is so-called "conventionalism," the belief that the 
facts of science are merely conventions which communities of 
scientists agree to treat as real. 
In sum, dualism and its offspring, idealism and skepticism, 
are very much a part of modern life. We have argued that this is 
the result of giving favored ontological status to the elements 
of physics. Of course, the picture is not quite that simple. 
As P.G.Wodehouse was won’t to have his characters say, "There 
are wheels within wheels." The various fields have been influenced 
by each other and by our comnmon philosophical heritage 
as well as directly by physics. And the influence is typically 
from a complex set of conceptions and misconceptions about the 
nature of the physical sciences. Likewise, the demonstration 
that the 'physical' world is not important for a given phenomenon 
often goes hand in hand with a desire to turn the tables 
and reduce everything to that phenomenon. So the literary 
critic would like to demonstrate that all is'fictional’, the biologist that  
all is cell activity, and the linguist that all is 
language. Despite these complications, however, we have intended 
to demonstrate that a certain attitude toward physics is (and 
has been for centuries) the root cause of radical skepticism. 
The problems with radical skepticism are manifold, as 
philosophers such as G. E. Moore , J . L. Austin, and Gilbert 
Ryle have shown in such detail (e.g., Moore, 1922, Ryle, 1949; 
Austin, 1962). The obvious problem, of course, is that it is 
self-defeating. If we cannot know anything, how can we know that 
we cannot know anything? There is also the problem of infinite 
regress. A statement like "All X is about X" leads either to 
infinite regress or becomes a meaningless tautology, or both. 
Of course, this infinite regress can be elevated to the status 
of a general principle such as "self-referentiality," but that 
does not make it any less an infinite regress. Another problem 
is that the doctrine of "autonomy" has the effect of trivializing  
what it attempts to illuminate. If art is only about 
itself, why should nonartists bother with it? Why should we as 
a culture support it? We could go on, but this paper is not 
really addressed to the committed skeptic, who would not, by 
his own criteria, accept our (or anyone else's ) arguments as 
true. Therefore, let us go on to a discussion of three episodes 
in science which epitomize the eternal dialectic between the 
Euclidean and Non-Euclidean approaches to the universe. 
 
 
3. Euclidean vs. Non-Euclidean 
 
Theories of light and sound are among the most basic and important of the sciences.  
This is easy to understand given the central role of seeing and hearing in human 
experience. Optics and harmony have held a central place in the mathematical 
sciences since their beginnings in ancient Greece. The early Pythagoreans tried to 
account for the pitch of a note by means of simple ratios between small whole numbers. 
Their enthusiasm for this approach to harmony was expressed in their 
slogan "all is number." This approach or vision is one of the 
main characteristics of Western mathematical science and has often been very successful. 
But right from the beginning it had its opponents. In the 4th century B.C. Aristoxenus 
opposed the Pythagorean theory of harmony. Van Jan has summarized 
Aristoxenus' teachings as follows (the material is quoted  
from Szabo, 1978, pp.11 2-113): 
 
In his harmonics he did not inquire into the origin 
of a tone, nor did he ask whether it was a number or 
a speed. The ear need only listen unaffectedly to the 
range of  tones; it will tell us with certainty which 
tones harmonize with each other. His system is 
based on the fourth and the fifth which are easily 
perceived consonances, and without asking which 
numerical ratios underlay them, he was able to 
determine from them the whole and half tones, etc. 
 
As a matter of fact, Aristoxenus' own words also attest to 
his anti-Pythagorean tendencies:  
 
We are attempting to draw conclusions which are in 
agreement with the data, as opposed to the theorists 
who proceded us. Some of them introduced completely 
foreign viewpoints into the subject and dismissed 
sensory experience as imprecise; hence they made up 
intelligible causes and stated that there were certain ratios 
between numbers and speeds on which the pitch of a note 
depended. These were all speculations which are completely  
foreign to the subject and absolutely contrary to appearances.  
Others renounced reasons and arguments completely and proclaimed 
their assertions as though they were oracular sayings; they 
likewise paid insufficient attention to the data. 
 
Several centuries later Goethe responded to Newtonian 
optics in a manner reminiscent of Aristoxenus' response to 
Pythagorean harmony. Mathematical optics had made great progress  
in the 17th century, culminating in Newton's theory of 
color expounded in his book Optics. We first quote from 
Newton's (1730) Optics so that the reader can see what Goethe 
was responding against. 
 
The homogeneal light and rays which appearred, or 
rather make objects appear so, I call rubrific or 
red-making; those which make objects appear yellow, 
green, blue, and violet, I call yellow-making, greenmaking, 
blue-making, violet-making, and so of the 
rest. And if at any time I speak of light and rays 
as coloured or enbued with colours, I would be understood 
to speak not philosophically and properly, but 
grossly, and according to such conceptions as vulgar 
people in seeing all these experiments would be apt 
to f rame. For the rays, to speak properly, are not 
coloured. In them there is nothing else than a certain 
power and disposition to stir up a sensation of this or 
that colour. For as sound in a bell or musical string, 
or other sounding body, is nothing but a trembling 
motion, and in the air nothing but that motion propagated  
from the object, and in the sensorium 'tis 
a sense of that motion under the form of sound; so 
colours in the object are no thing but a disposition 
to reflect this or that sort of rays more copiously 
than the rest; in the rays they are nothing but their 
dispositions to propagate this or that motion in the 
sensorium, and in the sensorium they are sensations 
of those motions under forms of colours (p.428). 
All the colours in the universe which are made by 
light, and depend not on the power of imagination, 
are either the colours of homogeneal lights, or compounded 
of these, and that either accurately or very 
nearly, according to the rule of the foregoing problem(p.442). 
 
The reader should note the "nothing buts," the primary-secondary 
distinctions, and the disdain for the ordinary person's 
viewpoint. (There is, of course, also much of great 
worth in Newton's Optics which even Goethe wouldn't have 
denied). Now for Goethe’s reaction (the quotes are taken from 
(Goethe, 1971): 
 
The dyer, a technician, will welcome our efforts. 
Those who have considered on the phenomena of dyeing 
are particularly unsatisfied with the current theory. 
They were the first to become aware of the shortcomings 
of Newtonian theory. It makes a great difference 
how one attacks knowledge, a science, through 
which door one enters. The practitioner, the manufacturer, 
who is daily and forcefully impressed by these phenomena,  
who experiences utility or harm by applying his convictions, 
who is not indifferent to losses of money and time but wants to go on  
to other accomplishments -- it is he who discovers much more 
rapidly than a scholar the fallacy of a theory, he 
who in the end must regard theory as honest currency. 
He cannot operate like the mathematician, whose formula 
is infallible even though the experience on which 
it is based is wrong. He will also approach the color 
theory from the viewpoint of painting, the aesthetic 
coloration of surfaces, and will hope to accomplish a 
most thankworthy task for the artist. We have endeavored 
to define in the sixth part the effects of color as 
addressed at once to the eye and mind, with a view 
to making them more available for the purposes of art. 
 
Although much in' this portion, and indeed throughout, 
is only a sketch, it should be remembered that 
all theoretics can in all strictness only point out 
leading principles, under which guidance, practice 
may proceed with vigor and be enabled to attain legitimate 
results (p.77). 
 
It is blasphemy to say that there is optical deception 
(p.38). 
 
The creative artist could gain but little advantage 
from, a theory whereby the optical scientist by his 
negative efforts merely explains overall occurring 
phenomena. Even though he admires the various colors 
of the prism along with other observers and has 
invented the harmony of these colors, it still remains 
a mystery to him just how he should achieve his objective, 
based on certain color relationships that he has 
created and organized. -The harmony of a painting depends 
to a large degree on light and shade. But the 
relationship of color to light and shade is not so 
easily discerned. Yet every painter soon discovers that 
the mere combination of both harmonies can fully complete 
his painting. It is not enough to mix color with 
black or brown in order to make a darker shade. Many 
attempts to innately gifted eyes, the exercise of 
sensitivities, and the tradition and example of great 
masters finally bring artists to a high plateau of excellence. 
Yet these artists could scarcely communicate the rules upon  
which they operate. One can convince oneself while viewing 
a great collection of paintings that nearly each master had a different  
way of handling color (p.18). 
  
It is clear that Goethe was concerned with our entire experience 
of color and saw almost no advantages -- and in fact 
many disadvantages -- in Newton's reductionistic, "nothing but" 
approach. Recently, the psychologist J. J. Gibson has taken 
the same attitude towards the problem of perception. 
Gibson is quite explicit in his rejection of traditional 
physics as part of a theory of visual perception. 
 
The size-levels of the world emphasized by modern 
physics, the atomic and the cosmic, are inappropriate 
for the psychologist. We are concerned here 
with things at the ecological level, with the habitat 
of animals and men, because we all behave with 
respect to things we can look at and feel, or smell 
and taste, and events one can listen to (Gibson, 1979, 
p.9). 
 
Gibson advocates what he calls an ecological physics: redescription 
of the physical world relevant to perceiving organisms. 
An interesting thing about Gibson's position is that, 
while not denying the reality of the physicist's description, 
he considers this ecological description to be just as 'real,' 
just as 'physical’,  and in fact more relevant for the particular 
purposes of the psychologist. Gibson's central theme might be 
paraphrased  “Wha t you see depends upon what you have to do.”  
Different organisms perceive different properties of the world, depending 
upon their particular needs. Thus, each organism, in effect, lives in a different 
environment, or what Gibson calls an "affordance structure." 
As Gibson puts it, "The affordances of the environment are what 
it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for 
good or ill" (p.127). Thus, high frequency sound is part of 
the bat's world but not of the human's (unless he is a sonar 
operator), and well defined color is part of the human's 
world but not the bat's. But it is important to emphasize that 
this relativity does not in any way imply that the environment 
is "subjective" or exists only in the "organism's head." 
Gibson calls his position "direct realism." In many ways, 
it is an articulation of the sort of position Gilbert Ryle argued 
for. It follows from simply taking as real what people 
say they see as real. Gibson's position holds out the possibility 
of avoiding skepticism while still allowing for fundamental  
incompatibilities between viewpoints. In the next section 
we develop a position related to Gibson's in the attempt to 
solve the problems we described in the previous sections. 
  
4.  Perspective Realism 
 
One way of describing the differences between the various 
sciences is to say that they have different conceptions of the 
line between primary and secondary qualities. In this sense, 
Einstein's general relativity is, perhaps, the most extreme view 
in one direction, in that the geometry of space-time is all that 
is given primary status. Everything else becomes an epiphenomenon. 
On the other hand, Gibson's ecological psychology 
may be the most extreme view in the other direction. Gibson's 
program might be described as an attempt to eliminate the 
notion of secondary qualities altogether, in the same sense 
that Kant, for example, tried to eliminate the primary qualities. 
This liberalism of Gibson’s recommends his direct realism for 
use as a metaviewpoint which might encompass all the others. 
In this section we will pursue this idea. 
We have seen that there is a plurality of viewpoints, and 
that the attempt to deny this plurality (by giving favored ontological 
status to one viewpoint) leads to solipsism. Our goal 
here is the development of a general account which will neither 
deny the reality of the world as described by the various sciences, 
nor deny the reality of the world of common sense. Our basic 
theme is that any distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities is only valid relative to some specific viewpoint. 
That is, each way of looking at things defines its own primary-secondary 
distinction and thus its own ontology. 
The relationship between scientific observation and 
scientific theory is formally similar to the traditional distinction 
between sensation and perception. As we have seen, 
the traditional notion of sensation was the way that physics 
was allowed into psychology. It served a felt need for a 
mental description which was commensurate with the physicist's 
world and thus the same for all knowers. The particular 
description which evolved had the added appeal of being apparently 
compatible with receptor physiology. Modern psychologists 
argue about the details of sensation, just as the British 
Empiricists had before them -- whether we "really" see patches 
of color or merely points of light - - however, before Gibson 
there was little doubt of  the need for the concept of  sensation. 
According to Gibson, however, the concept of sensation is 
an unfortunate confusion between the scientist and the ordinary 
perceiver. There is no evidence whatsoever for a primitive 
experience of meaningless points of light or colored shapes f rom 
which we infer our perceptions. By eliminating the concept of 
sensation altogether, Gibson is able to reject this indirect 
realism which leads to skepticism. Gibson actually does what 
philosophers had been claiming to do f rom the time of Descartes, 
he accepts as real the comman man's description of what he experiences. 
It follows that different experiences of the "same 
thing" are real differences and not merely different inferences 
from the same sensations. To reiterate, for Gibson, what is 
experienced is the affordance structure of the environment, 
namely the implications of the experiencer's potential actions. 
Experiences differ because potential actions (i.e., goals, 
purposes) differ. Another important idea of Gibson’s is that 
experience itself evolves in connection with action, so it 
makes sense to speak of organisms learning to experience the 
world in ways appropriate to their purposes. 
Although Gibson's work was concentrated on what has traditionally 
been called perception, his a pproach constitutes a general theory of mind. 
It is a theory of mind which treats all mental activity as a direct  
apprehension of the world. So just as perception is not built upon sensation, 
thinking and memory are not built upon perception. Rather, these "higher 
mental processes" are the apprehension of different properties, 
of the world, e.g., those that we refer to as past. Thus there 
is no distinction between seeing and seeing as. There is just a 
direct apprehension. All seeing is already a seeing as. Of 
course, it goes without saying that this approach requires a 
great deal of flexibility concerning what exists. Indeed, from 
this point of view, one might say that what is seen is what 
exists. Now let us turn to a consideration of scientific observation. 
In the same way that the traditional notion of sensation 
constrained models of  perception, the traditional notion of 
observation constrains models of science. Carnap's program was 
the classic example of the attempt to reduce science to a preconceived 
idea of observation . In a sense it was an attempt to 
reduce science to sensation in that his simple observation 
statements were very similar to the age-old description of 
sensations. But, as with all grand reductionist programs, 
Carnap's left a huge gap which had to be filled with "induction" 
or some such mechanism to get from his simple observation 
statements to higher-level theoretical statements. For example, 
from Carnap's point of view, atoms cannot be seen, they 
must somehow be inferred from simple observations. Another 
problem with Carnap's approach is that even if possible in 
principle, the  actual working out of such a reduction is intractable 
in practice. This is where Gibson comes in. Suppose we say that scientists 
can see atoms, that physicists use their instruments as 
tools to see atoms in the same way that astronomers use telescopes 
to see stars. There is a tendency to say that all you 
really see is the face of a dial or some equations. However , 
this objection assumes that there is one level of analysis 
which can without confusion be called observation. An analogy 
will help to show what is wrong with this preconceived notion 
of observation. When listening to a radio, what do we hear? We can identify 
as the direct experience any number of  steps in the causal 
sequence. There are vibrations of the speaker, radio waves 
coming through the air, electrical impulses in the microphone, 
vocal cord vibrations of the disk jockey, etc. Where we plug 
in to this causal nexus depends upon the kind of  account we want 
to give. Under most circumstances we would say that we hear 
what the disk jockey is saying. The other phenomena are merely 
the mechanism by which we accomplish this. It would make 
little sense to say that all we really hear are radio waves or 
speaker vibrations. Although such a statement would be true in 
a certain sense, it would be quite misleading for most purposes. 
Likewise, it is quite misleading to say that all a scientist 
sees are the positions of his dials. On the contrary, 
scientific training is designed to insure that scientists see 
a great deal more than the positions of dials. The fact that 
the nonscientist only sees dials only means that he has not learned 
to see as a scientist. It is not different f rom the inability 
of a non-chess player to see a sophisticated defense rather than 
just pieces being moved across the board. 
Therefore, let us say that different sciences have truly 
different viewpoints because they have different purposes. 
There is a general viewpoint for a given science (i.e., a metatheory) 
which is presupposed in the collection of data and which 
is connected with the goals and purposes of the science. The 
collection of data then becomes a process of  looking at the world 
in a particular way. 
It follows that the physicist's world is one way of looki ng 
at things, but not the way of looking at things. The physicist's 
viewpoint is relevant (indeed extremely powerful) for certain 
types of manipulations, predictions, etc., but useless for 
others. The same could be said of the world as described by any 
other science. 
Another analogy might be useful. Imagine a group of objects 
which vary subtly both in size and weight. Suppose some  
one is asked to classify the objects by size and given a very 
sensitive pair of calipers. Another person is given an extremely 
accurate scale and asked to classify the objects by weight. 
Neither classification is arbitrary, but the two are totally 
incommensurable. Weight simply does not exist for one person, 
size does not exist for the other. 
We could make the situation more interesting by making their 
respective instruments appear to be identical, complete with the 
same names for the result of the measurements. Imagine the 
arguments which would ensue when the two got together to discuss 
the objects in question. The problems might even be aggravated 
by the fact that weight and size are often correlated. 
Now let us generalize this example. The basic idea is that 
the world contains a great deal of structure which can, be 
"sliced up" in many different ways, depending upon one's needs. 
Thus the world from any particular point of view has a structure 
which contains some but not all of the total possible structure. 
To formalize this a bit we could say that there is a many-one 
mapping relation between the external world and the particular 
world specified by a given viewpoint . This differs from the 
more traditional position which relies upon the one-many mapping 
relation to account for differences in viewpoints. The traditional 
position is that there is only one viewpoint which is 
real (and which all perceivers have access to), but that various 
things are inferred from or added to this viewpoint depending 
upon the perceiver's characteristics. The advantage of our 
formulation is that it avoids the pessimistic conclusion that 
the individual worlds defined by particular viewpoints are at 
most only inspired by the world. To approach this issue from 
another angle, our formulation avoids the bizarre conclusion 
that each individual viewpoint is actually more complex than the 
world. To continue our scheme, these products of many-one mapping 
relations we call "homomorphisms" (as opposed to isomorphisms), 
following Ashby (1956). Now the different homomorphisms of an 
original set can be arranged into the mathematical structure 
called a lattice. An example of the lattice formed of an original set and its 
homomorphisms is shown in figure 2. 
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The figure represents a set containing four elements which generates 
eight homomorphic sets (there are six other possible homomorphisms 
which we have lef t out for simplicity). The parentheses 
indicate that the elements within them are not distinguished. 
The vertical lines indicate which sets are homomorphisms of 
which other sets at the higher levels. The numbers to the left 
signify the number of separate elements. 
 
 
So the original set contains four elements; the first generation of homomorphisms 
contains three elements, and so on. 
Notice that although all of the sets are veridical simplifications  
of the original, there are very basic incompatibilities between many  
of them. Another important thing to notice is that the degree of overlap  
between sets and the relative number of elements are orthogonal dimensions. 
Two sets which contain an equal number of elements may or may not be similar. 
A set which is simpler than another (i.e., has fewer elements) 
may be a homomorphism of it, they may be totally unrelated, or 
there may be partial overlap. Thus, different viewpoints may be  
related (or unrelated ) in a number of different ways, and yet all be "true"  
in the sense that they are all accurate simplifications of the world. 
 
Now let us turn to a pair of basic issues which have traditionally 
been troublesome for philosophers of science: the 
problem of error and the problem of progress. Both are more 
specific forms of the incompatibility which we have dealt with 
so far in a general way. The key to the problem of error is that it is viewpoint 
specific. A more formal way of putting this is to say that the 
truth value of any statement cannot be determined until the viewpoint 
is specified. One type of error is the simple failure to 
make a distinction which is relevant. Another type is to adopt a 
viewpoint which is inappropriate to the task at hand. In 
general an error is something which hampers the basic goals to 
which the viewpoint is specific. For example, a driver who 
fails to see a truck which pulls out in front of him would be 
said to have made an error despite the fact that he may have 
looked at that region of space-time in any numbe r of ways which 
would have been appropriate in other circumstances. This 
example illustrates an important point - -a truck is not really 
a collection of atoms. A t ruck is a truck. It has implications 
which are not contained within the notion of "collection of 
atoms." Collections of atoms do not pullout in f ront of 
people, trucks do.   
The issue of scientific progress is complicated by the 
admission that there are fundamentally different goals and thus 
fundamentally different viewpoints. The traditional notion of 
progress is best exemplified by the case in which the goals 
remain relatively constant and more and more distinctions are 
made. This would be equivalent to “moving up the lattice.” On 
the other hand, goals change as well,  that there can be 
radical transformations of viewpoint which cannot easily be 
called progress. In truth, both of these processes are 
probably taking place constantly, so that there is continuous 
refinement of the viewpoint relative to particular goals and 
continuous reassessment of goals. It should be clear f rom what we 
have said so far that communication is only possible within a viewpoint, 
not between them. The only way to foster communication between two  
viewpoints is to adopt a third which encompasses the first two. Likewise, 
there can be no commensurability of viewpoints until there is 
agreement about goals. This is a particular problem when those 
who hold two viewpoints do not  realize that their goals are 
different. 
 
In the next two sections we take another look at the "hard” 
sciences. We will see that even in the heart of the hard 
sciences there is a multiplicity of viewpoints. This multiplicity 
is not some thing to be bemoaned, but is instead the natural 
result of a plurality of goals and computational capabilities. 
 
 
5. The Exact Sciences and Non-Euclidean Logic 
 
As we have seen, the question of what "really" exists pervades  
the sciences and human thought in general. The belief 
that the infinite does not really exist goes back at least to 
Aristotle. Parrnenides even questioned the reality of plurality 
and change. (Einstein's vision has much in common with 
Parmenides). Towards the end of the nineteenth century an 
acrimonious exchange took place between Kronecker and Cantor 
regarding the reality of the actual (as opposed to potential) 
infinite. Kronecker claimed that only the finite integers really 
exist and all else is merely the work of man. Cantor countered 
that the essence of mathematics was its freedom and that he had 
attained a larger vision than Kronecker had who could not see the 
infinite. Most mathematicians have followed Cantor and found his 
paradise a more beautiful and alluring universe. 
Hilbert accepted Kronecker’s viewpoint for his metalanguage,  
but tried to recapture Cantor's paradise in a formal 
language. Hilbert was a formal pluralist in feeling that each 
mathematical discipline was entitled to its own formalization. 
Russell was a logical monist and felt that all of mathematics 
should be constructed within a single formal system. He put a 
great deal of labor into his program and looked askance at 
Hilbert. He felt that Hilbert's approach had all the advantages 
of theft over honest toil. What he did not realize was that in 
intellectual affairs, as in economic affairs, great fortunes 
are rarely ever accumulated through honest toil. What is needed 
is the intellectual leap. Russel’s program led to much interesting 
mathematics, but even if in principle it could be 
carried out, in practice the result would be computationally 
intractable. One would be translating simple, clear ideas into 
the fog of  Principia Mathematica. Russell's program has as much 
relevance to complex analysis as von Neumann's game theory has 
to chess. The understanding and appreciation of mathematics has 
very little to do with formal logic. For example, the following 
footnote occurs at the beginning of Wall's (1970) book Surgery 
On Compact Manifolds. 
 
Recent results of Kirby, Siebenmann and Lees have now 
(1966) provided such a technique. All our methods now 
extend to the topological case, with only trivial alteration. 
See (K8),(K9), (L10). 
 
All the experts could see the truth of this footnote. But 
this seeing is not explained by modus ponens. In his beautiful 
book Proofs and Refutations, Lakatos (1976) has shown that the 
mathematical process itself is dialectical and not Euclidean. 
At all times our ideas are formally inconsistent. But inconsistency, 
while still recognized as a pathology, is no longer 
seen to be a fatal disease. If we come across a contradiction, 
we localize it, isolate it, and try to cure it. But we have to 
get over our neurotic phobias concerning this disease and recognize 
it as inseparable from life itself. 
Hilbert's program collapsed with the startling work of. 
Godel. Mathematical logic and the study of formal systems have 
become a branch of mathematics instead of its foundation. 
Moreover, Cantor's paradise has been  raised into the metalanguage 
in order to prove deep theorems concerning formal systems 
as well as to provide a semantics for such systems. A. Robinson 
even defined non-standard formal systems which contain infinite 
formulas. One thus has a large plurality of different approaches 
to mathematics. Most mathematicians live in Cantor's paradise 
in spite of Russell's paradox; they simply learn to avoid making 
certain moves which have been shown to lead to contradictions. 
 
The situation is similar in physics also. As soon as the 
phenomena under discussion become sufficiently complex, one must 
depart from Euclidean strategies and adopt a non-Euclidean 
approach. This is very clearly stated by Blandford and Thorne 
(1979, p. 454-460) in the context of black hole astro-physics. 
 
The fundamental theory of black holes, as laid out in 
chapters 6 and 7, is well posed, elegant, clean and self contained. 
It follows inexorably and clearly f rom the 
fundamental laws of physics. The theory of black holes 
in an astrophysical environment is completely the 
opposite. Because it deals with the physics of matter 
in bulk-matter orbiting and accreting onto a hole- - 
it is subject  to all the dirty, complex uncertainties 
of the modern theory of  the behavior of bulk matter. 
If thunderstorms and tornados on Earth have eluded 
accurate theoretical modeling, how can one expect to 
predict even qualitatively their analogues in the 
turbulent, magnetized plasmas that accrete onto a 
black hole in a close binary system? One cannot. 
The best that can be hoped for is to develop the crudest 
of models as to the gross behavior of matter in the 
vicinities of holes. Fortunately, the resulting models have 
some modest hope of resembling reality. This is because 
the relative importance of physical processes near a hole can be 
characterized by dimensionless  ratios that usually 
turn out to be very large, and consequently, the 
gross behavior of matter near a hole is dominated by 
a small number of  processes. The task of the model 
builder is to identify the dominant processes in his 
given situation, and to construct approximate equations, 
describing their macroscopic effects. Historically, 
to identify the dominant processes has not been easy. 
This is because a vast number of  possible  processes must 
be considered and the model builder often, out of iqnorance, 
overlooks an important one. 
Thus it is that research on black hole astrophysics 
involves large bodies of physical theory. Within each 
body of theory one must have at one's fingertips 
approximate formulae that characterize a long list of 
possibly relevant  processes. The necessary bodies of 
theory include general  relativity, the physics of 
equilibrium and non-equilibrium plasmas, the physics of 
radiative processes, and the physics of stellar dynamical 
systems. 
Research in black hole astrophysics also requires, a good 
knowledge of the phenomenology of modern astronomy – the 
observed properties of stars, the main features of 
their evolution, the structure of the Galaxy, and the 
observed physical conditions in interstellarspace. 
The above example illustrates the following features 
of research in black hole astrophysics: 
(i) It involves an iteration back and forth 
between the equations of the macroscopic model and the 
microscopic physics which underlies those equations. 
One iterates until one obtains self-consistency. 
(ii) One must search carefully, at each iterative 
stage, for overlooked processes that might be so important 
as to invalidate the model (anchoring to a homogeneous 
interstellar magnetic field in the above example). 
(iii) One frequently encounters a 'branch point' 
where the model will take on two very different forms 
depending on what one assumes for the environment around 
the hole (homogeneous magnetic field versus tangled field 
in the above example), and where both branches might 
well occur in the real universe. This leads to a 
plethora of possible models, each corresponding to a 
different black hole environment and/or range of black 
hole masses. 
 
 
Probably the clearest case study of non-Euclidean logic 
occurs in the paper Problem Solving About Electrical Circuits 
by Stallman and Sussman (1979, p.33-39). We quote from their 
introduction. 
 A major problem confronting builders of automatic 
problem-solving systems is that of the combinatorial 
explosion of search-spaces. One way to attack 
this problem is to build systems that effectively use 
the results of failures to reduce the search space 
that learn from their exploration of blind alleys. 
Another way is to represent the problems and their 
solutions in such a way that combinatorial searches 
are self limiting. 
A second major problem is the difficulty of debugging 
programs containing large amounts of  knowledge. 
The complexity of the interactions between the "chunks" 
of  knowledge makes it difficult to ascertain what is to 
blame when a bug manifests itself. One approach to 
this problem is to build systems which remember and 
explain their reasoning. Such programs are more convincing 
when right, and easier to debug when wrong. 
ARS is an expert problem-solving system in which 
problem solving rules are represented as demons with 
multiple patterns of invocation monitoring and an associative 
data base. ARS performs all deductions in an 
antecedent manner, threading the deduced facts with 
justifications which mention the antecedent facts used 
and the rule of inference appl ied. These justifications 
are employed by ARS to determine the currently active 
data-base context for reasoning in hypothetical situations. 
Justifications are also used in the analysis 
of  blind alleys  to extract information which will limit 
future search . . . 
ARS supplies dependency - directed backtracking, a 
scheme which limits the search as follows: The 
system notes a contradiction when it attempts to solve 
an impossible algebraic relationship F, or when it 
discovers that a transistor's operating point is 
not within the possible range of its assumed region. 
The antecedents of the contradictory facts are scanned 
to find which nonlinear device state guesses (more 
generally, the backtrackable choicepoints) are relevant. 
ARS never tries that combination of guesses again. A 
short list of relevant choicepoints eliminates from 
consideration a large number of combinations of answers 
to all the other (irrelevant) choices. This is how 
the justifications (or dependency records ) are used 
to extract and retain more information f rom each 
contradiction than a chronological backtracking 
system. A chronological backtracking system would 
often have to try many more combinations, each time 
wasting much labor rediscovering the original contradiction. 
 
 
Note, that this is a case where a Euclidean approach does 
exist but is computationally intractable. We thus have a clear 
example of a non-Euclidean approach being used for good reasons 
and not just because of sloppiness. We thus gain a better 
appreciation of the gulfs that separate the mathematician, 
the physicist, and the engineer. Their programs are different, 
their aesthetics are different, and even their "logics" are 
different. At this point, the question of whether every non-Euclidean 
logic can be embedded in a Euclidean logic can only 
be answered dogmatically. Those in artificial intelliqence 
research assume a positive answer, while hermeneuticists assume 
a negative answer. However, even if you believe in an affirmative 
answer, a very simple non-Euclidean logic may only be 
embeddable in an immensely complex Euclidean logic, thus making, 
its embeddability irrelevant from a practical point of view 
(recall von Neumann's analysis of chess). 
 
 
6. Biology and Modern Physics 
 
Modern physics pervades nearly all aspects of modern biology. 
The striking difference between the explanations given by 
Aristotle and by modern biologists is partially explained by 
the fact that cells, molecules, atoms, electrons and photons 
were not part of Aristotle's universe. Modern biology teaches 
us that we breathe in order that oxygen can be supplied to the 
cells of the body, so that they can metabolize food to obtain 
energy needed for the other activities of life. This helps us 
understand the structure and purpose of the lungs, red blood 
cells, etc. Much of this understanding is at the level of 
molecular structure (for instance, the structure of hemoglobin). 
We explain the workings of green plants by saying that they are 
green because of the presence of molecu l e s of chlorophyll which 
are used to capture photons from the sun, thus providing the 
plant with its basic energy supply. The resemblance of children 
to their parents is explained by the DNA-sequence in their 
chromosomes. Sight is explained by appeal to photons captured 
by the rods and cones in the retina. One could go on and on. 
Considering modern physics' pervasive role in modern 
biology, it is quite interesting to note how little most biologists  
know of the foundations of modern physics. Their ideas 
of photons, atoms, and molecules resemble the incoherent pictures 
formed by Einstein and Bohr during the period 1900-1925. 
Even more interesting is the fact (?) that their ignorance of 
the viewpoints of modern quantum mechanics does not seem to 
hinder their work at all. While they think of photons and 
electrons "classically," the success of their work is due to the 
fact that they only actually use atomic language in the way 
Ostwald recommended at the end of the nineteenth century. This 
can be easily seen in Watson's book The Molecular Biology of 
The Gene. Let us reconsider our previous biological examples using 
correct quantum mechanical language. First of all, photons are 
not objects which could come from the sun. Instead, one assumes 
the existence of certain detectors called photon detectors which 
give positive readings under certain conditions such 
as being exposed to the sun light. Next, one discovers that 
plants grow well not only in sun light but also under many other 
conditions. A basic invariant of all these conditions is that 
under them our photon detector would yield positive results. 
Again, molecules aren't objects either. So plants aren't "made 
up" of molecules such as chlorophyll. Instead, another basic 
invariant of those conditions under which plants grow successfully 
and appear green is that a chlorophyll detector would yield a 
positive result. Children don't resemble their parents because 
of DNA sequences, but, instead, parents and their children's 
DNA-sequences are highly correlated and each is somewhat correlated 
to phenotypes. This is not the type of language usually 
used by biologists. But biologists like Watson aren't wholly 
to blame for their misuse of physical language. Watson gets his 
physics from Linus Pauling. In his book, The Nature of the 
Chemical Bond, Pauling constantly mixes classical ontology with 
modern quantum mechanics. Consider for example the following 
quote (Pauling, 1960, p.19). 
 
The electron distribution function for molecule-ion 
is shown in Figure 1-5. It is seen that the electron 
remains for most of the time in the small region just 
between the nuclei, only rarely getting on the far 
side of one of them; and we may feel that the presence 
of the electron between the two nuclei, where it can 
draw them together, provides some explanation of the 
stability of the bond.  
 
 
This picture resembles more the hidden variables views of 
Bohm and Nelson than it does the viewpoints of Bohr and Heisenberg. 
But the master knew better as is shown by the following 
quotes (Paulinq, 1960, pp. 217- 220). 
 
 
It is true that chemists, after long experience 
in the use of classical structure theory, have come to 
talk about, and probably to think about, the carbon-carbon 
double bond and other structural units of the 
theory as though they were real. Reflection leads us 
to recognize, however, that they are not real, but a  
rhetorical constructs in the same way as the individual 
Kekule structures for benzene. It is not possible to 
isolate a carbon-carbon bond and to subject it to 
experimental investigation. There is, indeed, no 
rigorous definition of the carbon-carbon double bond. 
We cannot accept, as a rigorous definition, the statement 
that the carbon-carbon double bond i s a bond between 
two carbon atoms that involves four electrons, 
because there is no experimental method of determining 
precisely the number of electrons that are involved in 
the interaction of two carbon atoms in a molecule, and, 
of course, this interaction has rigorously to be considered 
as being dependent on the nature of the entire molecule. 
I feel that the greatest advantage of the theory of 
resonance, as compared with other ways (such as the 
molecular-orbital method) of discussing the structure 
is that it makes use of structural elements with which the chemist is familiar. The 
theory should not be assessed as inadequate because of 
its occasional unskillful application. It becomes more 
and more powerful, just as does classical structure 
theory, as the chemist develops a better and better 
chemical intuition about it. 
The theory of resonance should not be identified 
with the valence-bond method of making approximate 
quantum-mechanical calculations of molecular wave 
functions and properties. The theory of resonance is 
essentially a chemical theory (an empirical theory, 
obtained largely by induction from the results of 
chemical experiments). Classical structure theory was 
developed purely from chemical facts, without any help 
from physics. The theory of resonance was also well 
on its way toward formulation before quantum mechanics 
was discovered. 
The theory of  resonance in chemistry is an essentially 
qualitative theory, which, like the classical 
structure theory, depends for its successful application 
largely upon a chemical feeling that it developed through 
practice. We may believe the theoretical physicist who 
tells us that all the properties of substances should be 
calculable by known methods-- the solution of the 
Schrodinger equation. In fact, however, we have seen 
that during the 35 years since the Schrodinger equation 
was discovered only a few accurate nonempirical quantummechanical 
calculations of the properties of substances 
in which the chemist is interested have been made. The 
chemist must still rely upon experiment for most of his 
information about the properties of substances. 
Experience has shown that he can be immensely helped by 
the use of the simple chemical structure theory. The 
theory of resonance is a part of the chemical structure 
theory, which has an essentially empirical ( inductive ) 
basis; it is not just a branch of quantum mechanics. 
 
 
Thus, no matter what the future may bring, chemistry is at 
present an independent science only slightly dependent upon 
physics and much dependent upon chemical intuition. The situation 
is similar for biology. Watson goes out of his way to 
insist that biology requires no “natural laws” not already found 
by chemistry and physics. He is opposing vitalists such as 
Bergson and the expectations of physicists such as Bohr and 
Schrodinger. Bohr hypothesizes that biology would yield a 
biological complementarity principle where the description of 
a living organism would be complementary to a description of its 
molecular structure. Such a position may yet come to pass when 
biology becomes sufficiently precise to become conscious of its 
“complementarities." 
 
 
7.  Natural Supernaturalism 
 
While there is a plurality of viewpoints within the sciences, 
the gap between the sciences and the humanities is much larger 
than that within the sciences. All the sciences attempt to 
take a value neutral, I-it, approach to their respective 
subject matters. This is as true in anthropology as it is in 
physics. An anthropologist qua scientist attempts to describe 
man and his culture in unemotional language similar to the 
astronomer's description of the planets and their motion. But 
the use of such language is often found very objectionable by 
non-scientists. The astronomer has succeeded in demoting the 
planets from gods to merely large chunks of rock. Humanists 
are often afraid that science will have a similar "success" 
with man. Plato railed at the atomists f or presenting a vision 
of the universe stripped of its most important aspects: value, 
honor, justice. The debate continues today with such thinkers as 
B. F. Skinner and E. O. Wilson. The effects of taking the 
scientific vision too seriously are clearly seen in Pascal's 
fleeing it in horror and more recently in the fatalistic tone 
of Loren Eisley's autobiography. The scientific vision inevitably 
leads to viewing life as “ .. . a tale/ told by an idiot full of 
sound and fury/ signifying nothing.” At the 
conclusion of his book The First Three Minutes, Steven Weinberg 
(1977) unconsciously recognizes the limitations of the vision 
he has presented when he suggests that the acceptance of this 
vision is one of the few things that raises the human predicament 
from a farce to a tragedy. But viewing the human predicament 
as either a farce or a tragedy is a point of view which 
does not fit into the framework of the big bang model. The 
universe Weinberg presents is simply not the total universe, but 
merely the (or better yet, a ) physical universe. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, romantics such 
as Wordsworth staged a counterattack on the scientific world 
view. The old Christian worldview of the Bible, Dante and 
Milton was no longer believable after the scientific revolutions 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But, on the other 
hand, it was also clear to the romantics that Newton was not 
enough. Unfortunately, in their counterattack they often went 
off the deep end. Man was no longer at the center of the universe 
but was instead its creator. Fichte's ego resembles 
Plotinus' God with the universe an emanation thereof. 
This is certainly more than ample compensation for our loss at 
the hands of Copernicus. But is the Milky Way really something 
we can ask credit for? To reiterate a point, the problem with 
many of the romantics was that they conceded too much to the 
physicists. They gave the physicists the real world and were 
willing to settle for the mind of man. But is beauty any less 
in a sunset than its color? What is needed is a vision of the 
world which includes beauty and justice on the same ontological level with color and 
mass. Lack of consensus with regard to 
these values simply means that there will be a plurality of 
such visions - -as Mao said (but didn’t mean) "let a thousand 
flowers bloom." Insistence on consensus merely results in impoverished 
world views. In the next section we consider some of 
the richest worldviews, namely, those including the supernatural. 
 
 
8. Supernaturalism Revisited 
 
When Napoleon asked LaPlace where God was in his universe, 
LaPlace responded that he had no need of that hypothesis. Since 
the publication of Darwin’s evolutionary theories, all the f orce 
has gone out of the argument from design. Aristotle's argument 
of the first cause or unmoved mover has always been unmoving. 
But, for many people, God is not an hypothesis, but a fact, a 
phenomenon, an experience. For these people LaPlace and Darwin 
and secular humanism in general describe an impoverished 
universe devoid of its most important and meaningful aspects. 
For instance, the Mormon vision includes an infinite regress of 
gods so that everyone gains meaning by reference to his God, and 
God by reference to his Super-God etc. So much for Aristotle. 
Further development of Mormon theology may take it along the 
road blazed by Cantor and yield a transfinite hierarchy of gods. 
The lack of consensus concerning the supernatural need be 
no more significant than the lack of consensus in aesthetics or 
in science itself. One may anticipate the emergence of religions 
which are tolerant and open to change and development. 
They would view our understanding of the supernatural as something 
which is growing and developing just as is our understanding 
of the natural. 
Of course, the skeptic may, and should, question the 
validity and significance of religious experiences. He can quite 
easily accept their subjective reality but deny their ontological 
significance. He can write them off as hallucination and 
illusion and declare that God is dead. But, as we have seen, a 
first class skeptic like Hume can write off practically everything 
else also. Not only the gods, but also honor, truth, 
rationality, reality and many other aspects of our universe are 
at stake. Of course, Hume himself was only showing that one 
couldn't have "certainty" regarding these or any other aspects 
of the universe. But absolute certainty isn’t  required. It's 
enough to make our choices and live by them. And most people 
prefer to live in a rich rather than an impoverished universe. 
The time may be ripe for a non-Euclidean synthesis, of the 
sciences, the humanities, and theology. 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
One of our most powerful myths is the story of the tower 
of Babel where by an original unity was shattered into diversity. 
Much of our intellectual history consists of attempts to find 
common grounds upon which to erect unified sciences. Many 
bewail the unsatisfactory situation in the social sciences, 
humanities, and theology where many schools compete for dominance. 
This situation contrasts with the seeming harmony of the 
natural sciences. The claim we have made here is that the 
relative lack of polemics in the ha rd sciences is not due to a 
consensus concerning fundamental theoretical structures, but 
is instead a much more complicated sociological fact. For 
instance, a close study of the various electron models reveals 
tremendous differences. The differences between the Schrodinger, 
Dirac, and Feynman theories of an electron appear to us as huge 
as the differences between the Freudian, Skinnerian and Piagetian 
theories of human behavior. But physicists don't mind the 
diversity. They take an eclectic approach using whichever 
model seems most appropriate under the circumstances. By contrast, 
many psychologists feel that the alternative approaches 
to human behavior are competing theories and only one of  them 
will eventually prevail. 
In studying complex phenomena there are always a variety 
of possible approaches. Too much of an insistence on consensus 
results in very impoverished starting points such as those taken 
by Russell and Carnap . From such starting points it is very 
difficult to get anywhere. But the other extreme often results 
in a tower of Babel where each scientist has not only his 
own theories but his own scientific methodology and logic. To 
paraphrase Goethe: One can convince one self while viewing a 
great collection of scientific works that nearly each master 
had a different way of approaching nature. In our opinion, 
what is required in science is the same thing that is required 
in art, namely "taste" and "judgment." 
To say this, however, is not to opt for an "anything goes" 
relativism or radical idealism. On the contrary, we have argued 
that toleration is necessary in order to save realism, and thus 
avoid such radical solutions. To the extent that agreement 
can be reached about goals, there are clear and demonstrable 
relative advantages between various positions. The determination 
of these advantages, though, may not be something that is 
clearly formalizable. On the other hand, in those cases where 
there is no agreement about goals, we should not expect consensus. 
In fact, our point has been that in these cases the attempt 
to enforce consensus carries grave risks. 
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